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This paper constructs a simple repeated game model to analyze how industry
outcomes alter if a regulated input monopolist is allowed to integrate into
the downstream retail market. Integration helps overcome double marginal-
ization — a feature well known in the existing literature. Unlike existing
static models, however, integration also makes tacit collusion more diﬃcult
in a repeated game framework. If the regulated input price exceeds marginal
cost, an integrated monopolist has an incentive to increase retail sales as this
raises upstream proﬁts. It will be less willing to engage in any tacitly collu-
sive conduct in the downstream market and it has a greater incentive to cheat
on any collusive arrangement. We show that these eﬀects may dominate in-
put price regulation. A social planner may prefer the upstream monopoly to
participate in the downstream market, even if integration leads to a higher
regulated input price. The anti-competitive eﬀects of the higher input price
are more than oﬀset by the pro-competitive eﬀects of integration.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: L12, L51.
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The analysis of vertical arrangements between ﬁrms has been an important
part of recent competition policy. In utility industries, such as telecommu-
nications and electricity, attention has focused on the interaction between
potentially competitive downstream ﬁrms and an upstream monopoly that
controls an essential input. Issues such as the optimal access price, verti-
cal foreclosure and the incentive for the upstream ﬁrm to engage in anti-
competitive conduct, have been explored by the literature.1
Concern that an upstream monopoly will behave in an anti-competitive
way if it is allowed to participate in a potentially competitive downstream
market, has led to industry restructuring and regulatory intervention. For
example, one of the factors leading to the break up of AT&T in the U.S. in the
1980s was a concern about anti-competitive behavior by an integrated, regu-
lated telecommunications carrier.2 More recently, the 1996 U.S. Telecommu-
nications Act set out conditions that local exchange carriers had to satisfy be-
fore they could enter the competitive long-distance market. Anti-competitive
concerns led the UK government to restrict entry by ﬁxed carriers into mobile
telephony (Geroski, et. al., 1989), and to restructure the electricity industry
before privatization.3 Similar restructuring to separate upstream monopoly
and downstream ﬁrms has occurred in the electricity, gas and rail industries
in Australia (King and Maddock, 1996).
1Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) provide a survey of the literature on access pricing and
vertical arrangements in telecommunciations . Economides (1998) and Sibley and Weis-
man (1998) consider the incentive for an upstream monopoly to raise rivals’ cost if it is
integrated into the downstream sector. Rey and Tirole (1996) and McAfee and Schwartz
(1994) consider the potential for foreclosure. Gans and De Fontenay consider the use of
vertical integration to avoid hold-up.
2See Brennan (1987) and Noll and Owen(1989).
3Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) provide surveys
of British utility reforms.
1Preventing an upstream monopoly from participating in downstream pro-
duction may reduce the scope for some types of anti-competitive behavior.
However, vertical separation is not costless. If there are economies of scope
between upstream and downstream operations, forced vertical separation will
tend to raise production costs. Separation may also alter a regulator’s ability
to set an eﬃcient price for the input supplied by the monopoly. Gilbert and
Riordan (1995) use an incentive regulation model to show that two vertically
separated monopolies are more diﬃcult to regulate than a single integrated
monopoly. However, Vickers (1995) shows that integration can lead to a
higher regulated input price when the downstream market is open to com-
petitive production.
The consensus from the literature is that allowing an upstream monopoly
that supplies an essential input, to participate in the downstream market,
makes it more diﬃcult to regulate the monopoly. In particular, following
Vickers (1995), integration tends to raise the regulated access price. How-
ever, there may be oﬀsetting beneﬁts. Integration can reduce excessive down-
stream entry (Vickers 1995) or reduce excessive variety in a monopolistically
competitive downstream market (Kuhn and Vives, 1999). As a result, there is
an ambiguous trade-oﬀ between vertical separation, input pricing and social
welfare.
One beneﬁt of vertical integration focused on by existing studies is the
moderation of double marginalization. In a one-shot model of competition,
if the regulated input price exceeds marginal cost then downstream com-
petitors face a distorted price and as a result set the retail price ‘too high’.
If the upstream monopoly also competes downstream then it faces the true
marginal cost of the essential input and tends to price more aggressively. As
a result, integration can lower the retail price.
2Integration has an additional beneﬁt that is not captured by the existing
studies if downstream ﬁrms interact repeatedly over time. When the regu-
lated input price exceeds marginal cost, the monopoly has an incentive to
increase retail sales as this tends to raise upstream proﬁts. If the monopoly
is integrated into the downstream market, it can act aggressively to raise
total sales. An integrated monopoly will be less willing to engage in any
tacitly collusive conduct in the downstream market as this tends to reduce
upstream proﬁts. Further, the integrated ﬁrm has a greater incentive to cheat
on any collusive arrangement than a non-integrated downstream competitor.
The integrated ﬁrm ﬁnds the threat of a retail price war less of a deterrent
than non-integrated ﬁrms. While the integrated monopoly loses retail proﬁt
during a price war, it gains wholesale sales and proﬁt.
This paper constructs a simple repeated game model to capture this pro-
competitive eﬀect of integration. In general, competition will lead to a variety
of potential equilibrium prices. We compare these equilibrium sets with and
without integration for a variety of input prices, using diﬀerent regulatory
objectives. For example, if the objective is to maximize the minimum social
welfare in equilibrium, then integration is preferred even if it involves a higher
input price. We also consider the stability of any tacitly collusive equilibrium
price and show that integration always makes the equilibrium less stable in
the sense that it can only be supported with either a smaller number of
downstream competitors or a higher discount factor. Finally, we consider
particular subsets of equilibrium prices. For example, we consider the set of
equilibrium prices that are dominant for the downstream ﬁrms, in the sense
that no alternative equilibrium can make all ﬁrms better oﬀ. We show that
with integration all dominant prices are strictly below the dominant price in
the absence of integration. Again, this result is independent of the regulated
3input price and remains valid even if integration raises this regulated price.
Overall, this paper shows that the case for allowing an upstream monopoly
to participate in a downstream market is stronger than suggested by the ex-
isting literature. The potential for anti-competitive conduct, for example by
reducing the quality of the input supplied to competitors, rises with inte-
gration. But integration also has signiﬁcant competitive beneﬁts. In partic-
ular, when downstream ﬁrms interact repeatedly, integration introduces an
aggressive downstream competitor who has less interest in maintaining a tac-
itly collusive outcome. As a result, integration can lead to lower retail prices
even when it involves a higher input price. In this sense, industry structure is
more important for a competitive outcome than the speciﬁc regulated input
price.
2 The model
Consider an industry with N + 1 retail ﬁrms and an upstream monopoly.
We consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case there is no vertical integration. The
upstream monopoly is separate from the retail ﬁrms and each retail ﬁrm
buys an essential input from the monopoly. In the second case, the upstream
monopoly owns one of the retail ﬁrms. It supplies the input to that retail
ﬁrm and also sells the input to the remaining N non-integrated retail ﬁrms.
The authorities regulate the price of the essential input at a per unit.
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of the input is constant and
given by A. Production of the essential input might also involve a per-period
ﬁxed cost F, so if the upstream monopoly sells a total of Q units of the
input in any period its proﬁt is given by [a−A]Q−F. We will only consider
situations where the authorities set an input price to at least cover marginal
4cost so that a ≥ A.4
Let n denote a generic retail ﬁrm. Each of these ﬁrms transforms the
essential input into an identical ﬁnal product using constant returns to scale
technology. We normalize units so that one unit of the input is needed to
produce one unit of the ﬁnal product, where c denotes the cost per unit of
transforming the input into ﬁnal product. The retail ﬁrms compete in each
period by simultaneously setting their individual prices. Competition con-
tinues for a potentially inﬁnite number of periods and the common discount
factor for the retail ﬁrms is denoted by δ. We assume that δ < 1. In each
period, all consumers simply buy from the cheapest retailer. If indiﬀerent,
consumers randomly choose between retailers, where ρn is the probability
that each consumer will choose ﬁrm n. There are a large number of con-
sumers so that ρn represents ﬁrm n’s market share.5
Demand for the ﬁnal product is denoted by Q(P), where P is the (lowest)
retail price faced by consumers and Q is the total quantity of the retail
product purchased. We assume that Q(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable
with Q0(·) < 0. For any price P, we denote the total proﬁts that accrue
to the retailers at this price in one period by π(P). Each retailer’s proﬁt
is denoted by πn. The total proﬁts that accrue to the retailers and to the
upstream monopoly in one period equal π(P)+[a−A]Q(P). This is denoted
by Π(P).
It is useful to deﬁne two reference prices. First, for any regulated input
price a, let P r refer to the monopoly price for a retailer with marginal cost
c + a. In other words, Q0(P r)P r + Q(P r) − Q0(P r)[c + a] = 0. Second, let
4With a separate upstream monopoly, participation requires that the monopoly make
non-negative proﬁts in equilibrium. As a minimum, this requires that a ≥ A.
5In other words, the retail ﬁrms play a standard inﬁnitely repeated Bertrand competi-
tion game.
5P i refer to the monopoly price for an integrated upstream ﬁrm and retailer
so that Q0(P i)P i + Q(P i) − Q0(P i)[c + A] = 0. The retail price P i would
maximize the joint proﬁts of both the retailers and the upstream monopoly
if it were set in every period. Given the input price, the retail price P r would
maximize the joint proﬁts of the retail ﬁrms if it were set in every period.
Because a ≥ A, P r ≥ P i with equality only when a = A.6 We assume that
the regulated input price is not so high that total industry proﬁts Π would
be maximized when the retailers sell at a loss. In other words, we assume
that a < P i − c.7
We concentrate on the stationary equilibria of the game between the
retail ﬁrms and consider those equilibria that are supported by the ‘grim
punishment’ strategy of reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever.
In this model, such punishment involves selling at a price equal to retail
marginal cost, a + c in each period.
We make two further assumptions that simplify the analysis.
Assumption one: for a given regulated input price a, if there are two fea-
sible stationary price equilibria that can be supported, but one equilibrium
is preferred to the other by all participants in the market — the retail ﬁrms,
the upstream monopoly and the consumers — in that one equilibrium in-
volves a lower price but provides at least the same proﬁts to each ﬁrm, then
the ﬁrms do not play the non-preferred equilibrium.
Assumption two: For all P, Q00(P) ≤ 0.





Q00(P)[P − c − a] + 2Q0(P)
But Q00(P)[P −c−a]+2Q0(P) < 0 by the second order conditions for proﬁt maximization,
so that (dP/da) > 0.
7This assumption rules out certain trivial equilibria when one of the retail ﬁrms is
owned by the upstream monopoly.
6Under assumption one, if the upstream ﬁrm is not integrated into the
retail market, it is trivial to show that we only need to focus on equilibria
involving a price no greater than P r.8 We show below that when the upstream
monopoly is integrated with one of the retail ﬁrms, assumption one implies
that we need only consider equilibria where the retail price is no greater than
P i.
Assumption two is a reasonably strong constraint on demand. It guar-
antees that the proﬁt function for each ﬁrm is strictly concave, whether or
not there is integration between a retail ﬁrm and the upstream monopoly.
Because of this, assumption two allows us to avoid potential non-convexities
that can arise when the number of retail ﬁrms change. The assumption is
suﬃcient, but not necessary, for some of the results under integration.
2.1 Competition without integration
We ﬁrst consider the situation when the retail ﬁrms are separate from the up-
stream monopoly. Because the input price is set by a regulator, the upstream
monopoly cannot directly interact with the retail ﬁrms and has no active role
in determining the market outcome.9 The potential equilibrium outcomes in
this situation are well understood in the literature and are summarized by
the following lemma.10
Lemma 1 For a regulated input price a and δ ≥ N
N+1, any price P ∈ [c +
a,P r] can be supported as a subgame perfect stationary equilibrium. For
8Both the upstream ﬁrm and the consumers strictly prefer lower retail prices. By the
deﬁnition of Pr any price greater than Pr results in less total proﬁt for the retail ﬁrms
than Pr. It is simple to show that if there is an equilibrium price greater than Pr then
there exists an equilibrium among retail ﬁrms with price Pr that gives each retailer at
least the same proﬁt.
9In particular, the upstream monopoly has no strategies except to sell the amount of
input that is demanded by the retailers.
10See for example Friedman (1971) and Tirole (1988).
7δ < N
N+1 the only stationary equilibria involve setting a price P = c + a.
All proofs are in the appendix.
From lemma 1 any retail price P ∈ (c + a,P r] can be supported as an
equilibrium for δ ≥ (N/N+1). But the supportable shares of the retail proﬁts
that accrue in equilibrium to each ﬁrm will vary as δ varies. Corollary 2
characterizes the equilibrium market (and hence proﬁt) shares for the retail
ﬁrms and follows directly from the proof of lemma 1.
Corollary 2 Suppose δ ≥ N
N+1 and consider a retail price P ∈ (c + a,P r].
P is supportable as a stationary equilibrium iﬀ market shares are given by
ρn ∈ [1 − δ,1 − N(1 − δ)] for all n.
When δ ≥ (N/N + 1) the equilibrium outcomes that maximize the joint
proﬁts of the retail ﬁrms involve setting a price of P r. So when δ ≥ (N/N+1)
the set of stationary equilibria that maximize the joint proﬁts of the retailers
is given by
Dr = {πn : ∀n πn ∈ [(1 − δ)π(P






From lemma 1, any other price that involves positive proﬁts to the ﬁrms,
P ∈ (c + a,P r) is only supportable as a stationary equilibrium price if δ is
suﬃciently large so that P r is also sustainable as an equilibrium price. From
corollary 2, the sustainable market shares do not depend on the equilibrium
price for P ∈ (c+a,P r]. So the set of equilibria Dr represents a ‘dominant’ set
for the retail ﬁrms in the sense that for any stationary equilibrium involving
a price P ∈ (c+a,P r), there exists an equilibrium in set Dr that provides at
least as much proﬁt to all retail ﬁrms and a strictly greater level of proﬁt to at
least one retail ﬁrm. If retail ﬁrms are able to co-ordinate on an equilibrium
that is dominant in this sense, then they will play an equilibrium in the set
Dr.
82.2 Competition with integration
We now consider the situation where one of the retail ﬁrms is integrated with
the input monopoly. Without loss of generality we assume that retail ﬁrm
N + 1 is vertically integrated. This ﬁrm receives proﬁt from both its retail
sales and from the sale of the essential input to its retail competitors. There
are N non-integrated retailers. Again, the input price is set equal to a by a
regulator and there is no ability for the integrated ﬁrm either to manipulate
the price or quality of the essential input.11
Integration allows the upstream monopoly to play an active role in the
market outcome. While the monopoly must still supply whatever quantity of
input is demanded by the (non-integrated) retailers, it can use its retail arm
to inﬂuence the retail-level behavior. This is manifested in two ways. First,
the integrated ﬁrm receives positive proﬁts from selling the input. It makes
proﬁt [a − A]Q(a + c) in the one-shot equilibrium. These wholesale proﬁts
will be lower whenever the retail price is higher than (a+c). Because of this
the wholesale proﬁt aﬀects the incentive for the integrated ﬁrm to maintain
a high retail price. This in turn will aﬀect the share of total proﬁt that must
accrue to each ﬁrm in a stationary equilibrium.
Second, with integration the joint proﬁt maximizing price for all retail
ﬁrms is lower and equal to P i. Because integration internalizes the spill over
between retail pricing and upstream sales, integration creates an incentive
for ﬁrms to co-ordinate on a lower price.
We start by noting that if there is no gap between the regulated input
price and the marginal cost of the input, then integration is irrelevant.
11This enables us to ignore various potential anti-competitive behaviours by the inte-
grated ﬁrm. For example, see Economides (1998).
9Comment 3 If the input price a is set equal to marginal cost A then inte-
gration has no aﬀect on the set of stationary equilibria.
Comment 3 follows from the absence of wholesale proﬁts when a = A.
In this situation, integration has no aﬀect on any ﬁrm’s proﬁts and cannot
aﬀect the set of stationary equilibria. For this reason, we concentrate on sit-
uations where a > A to show how integration alters the potential equilibrium
outcomes for the industry.
If a > A then integration will change the conditions for equilibrium. For
any price P ∈ (a + cP i] these conditions are given by
1
1 − δ









πn(P) ≥ π(P) (2)
Inequality (1) requires that the integrated ﬁrm prefers to set the equilib-
rium price rather than deviate, seize the entire retail proﬁt for one period,
and then face the ‘grim punishment’ forever. Inequality (2) is the equivalent
condition for each of the non-integrated ﬁrms. If the equilibrium price is
P > P i then any deviation by the integrated ﬁrm will involve setting the
price P i for one period. Thus, P i replaces P on the right-hand-side of (1). If
P > P r then any deviation by a non-integrated ﬁrm will involve setting the
price P r for one period. Thus, P r replaces P on the right-hand-side of (2).
To allow comparison with the non-integrated situation, we consider re-
tail prices up to and including P r. Lemma 4, however, shows that for any
equilibrium with a retail price that exceeds P i, there is an equilibrium with
10a retail price equal to P i that provides each ﬁrm with at least the same prof-
its. Such an equilibrium will clearly also be preferred by consumers, so any
equilibrium with a price greater than P i violates assumption 1. Thus, from
lemma 4, we only need to consider equilibria with a price no greater than P i.
Lemma 4 Consider any stationary equilibrium with P ∈ (P i,P r]. There
exists a stationary equilibrium with P = P i that gives at least the same proﬁt
to each ﬁrm and is strictly preferred by consumers.
It remains to show if and when P i or any other price can be sustained as a
stationary equilibrium. Lemma 5 examines this. For any price P ∈ (a+c,P i]
this lemma characterizes the minimum value of the discount factor, δ, that
is needed to sustain the price as a subgame perfect stationary equilibrium.
We denote this minimum value of the discount factor for a retail price P and
an input price a by ˜ δ(P,a).
Lemma 5 Given the input price a, a price P ∈ (c + a,P i] can be supported
as a subgame perfect stationary equilibrium iﬀ δ ≥ ˜ δ(P,a) where
˜ δ(P,a) =
NQ(P)[P − a − c]
(N + 1)Q(P)[P − a − c] − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)]
It is easy to conﬁrm that when a > A then ˜ δ(P,a) ∈ ( N
N+1,1) for all
P ∈ (a + c,P i]. First, note that the denominator of ˜ δ(P,a) is equivalent to
Nπ(P)+Π(P)−[a−A]Q(a+c). But this exceeds Nπ(P) for P ∈ (a+c,P i],
so that ˜ δ(P,a) < 1. Also note that [a−A][Q(a+c)−Q(P)] > 0 when a > A
so that ˜ δ(P,a) > N









However, when a = A, ˜ δ(P,A) = N
N+1 for all P.
11In general, ˜ δ(P,a) need not be monotonic in P. Lemma 6 shows that
˜ δ(P,a) will be increasing either in the neighborhood of P i or, under assump-
tion two. It also shows that ˜ δ(P,a) is increasing in both the number of
non-integrated retailers and in the regulated input price.
Lemma 6 (i) ˜ δ(P,a) is increasing in P at P = P i, (ii) ˜ δ(P,a) is increasing
in N for all P > a + c, (iii) ˜ δ(P,a) is increasing in a for all P > a + c and
(iv) under assumption two, ˜ δ(P,a) is increasing in P for P ∈ (c + a,P i].
Finally, we can consider the set of stationary equilibrium outcomes if
the ﬁrms only play equilibria that are not dominated from their perspective.
Assume that the discount factor is suﬃciently high to support all prices
P ∈ (a+c,P i] as equilibria. In other words, δ > ˜ δ(P,a) for all P ∈ (a+c,P i].
Under assumption two, it is suﬃcient that δ > ˜ δ(P i,a).
Unlike the non-integrated equilibria presented in section 2.1, the non-
dominated equilibria under integration can involve a range of prices. In
particular, the best non-dominated equilibrium for a subset of ﬁrms will
depend on both the number of ﬁrms in the subset and the composition of
the subset.
First suppose that there is a subset of ﬁrms composed of N non-integrated
retailers. If N < N then the non-dominated equilibrium that maximizes the
joint proﬁts of the subset will involve a price strictly below P i. This contrasts
with the situation where all ﬁrms are non-integrated and non-dominated
equilibria only involved a price equal to P r. The diﬀerence arises because
the incentive for the integrated ﬁrm to deviate from an equilibrium tends
to decrease as the retail price decreases. The optimal equilibrium for the
subset is found by maximizing the subset’s proﬁts subject to guaranteeing
no deviation by the integrated ﬁrm and other non-integrated ﬁrms. As the
12retail price falls below P i, there are less retail proﬁts for the subset of ﬁrms
to seize but this is more than oﬀset by the reduced need to share retail proﬁts
with the integrated ﬁrm.
Let P ∗
r (N) be the price associated with the best non-dominated equilib-
rium for a subset involving N non-integrated ﬁrms. Lemma 7 characterizes
P ∗
r (N) and shows that P ∗
r (N) ∈ (c + a,P i] with P ∗
r (N) < P i if N < N.
Lemma 7 Suppose δ > ˜ δ(P i,a) and consider any subset of non-integrated
ﬁrms with N members. The equilibrium that maximizes the joint proﬁt of
this subset involves a price P ∗
r (N) ∈ (a + c,P i] where P ∗
r (N) solves
π
0(P)[1 − (N + 1 − N)(1 − δ)] + δ[a − A]Q
0(P) = 0 (3)
Further, if N < N then P ∗
r (N) < P i. But P ∗
r (N) = P i
As the relevant set of non-integrated ﬁrms increases in size, the best non-
dominated equilibrium for this set involves an increasingly higher price. To





−(1 − δ)π0(P ∗
r )
π00(P ∗
r )[1 − (N + 1 − N)(1 − δ) + δ[a − A]Q00(P ∗
r )






−(N − N)Q0(P ∗
r )
π00(P ∗
r )[1 − (N + 1 − N)(1 − δ)] + δ[a − A]Q00(P ∗
r )
so that P ∗
r (N) is decreasing in a for N > N and is constant in a when
N = N.12
Now, suppose that there is a subset of ﬁrms including the integrated ﬁrm
and N non-integrated retailers. Let P ∗
i (N) be the price associated with
12Remembering that ˜ δ(P,a) depends upon a so that any change in a must continue to
satisfy the assumption that δ is above ˜ δ(Pi,a).
13the best non-dominated equilibrium for this subset of ﬁrms, where N ∈
{0,...,N}. Lemma 8 characterizes P ∗
i (N).
Lemma 8 Suppose δ > ˜ δ(P i,a) and consider any subset of ﬁrms including
the integrated ﬁrm and N non-integrated ﬁrms. The equilibrium that maxi-
mizes the joint proﬁt of this subset involves a price P ∗




0(P)[1 − (N − N)(1 − δ)] + [a − A]Q
0(P) = 0 (4)
Further, if N < N and a + c < P i then P ∗
i (N) < P i. But P ∗
i (N) = P i
Again, it is easy to see that as the number of non-integrated ﬁrms in the
relevant subset increases, the best non-dominated equilibrium for the subset





−[(N − N)(1 − δ)]Q0(P ∗
r )
π00(P ∗
i )(1 − (N − N)(1 − δ)) + [a − A]Q00(P ∗
i )
so that P ∗
i (N) is decreasing in a when N > N and is constant in a when
N = N.13
We can compare the prices associated with particular non-dominated
equilibria. In particular, consider P ∗
r (1) and P ∗





r (1))[1 − N(1 − δ)] + δ[a − A]Q
0(P
∗
r (1)) = 0 (5)
From (15) and assumption 2, we know that if P > P ∗
i (0) then
π
0(P)[1 − N(1 − δ)] + [a − A]Q
0(P) < 0 (6)
Substituting P ∗
r (1) into the left-hand-side of (6) and using equation (5) gives
(1 − δ)[a − A]Q0(P ∗
r (1)). But this is less than zero so that P ∗
r (1) > P ∗
i (0).
13Remembering that we have assumed that δ > ˜ δ(Pi,a) and this constraint must con-
tinue to hold as a alters.
14In other words, the best non-dominated equilibrium for the integrated ﬁrm
involves a strictly lower price than the best non-dominated equilibrium for a
single non-integrated ﬁrm.
Lemma 7 and 8 can be used to characterize the set of non-dominated
equilibria when one retail ﬁrm is integrated with the network owner. For
example, if N = 1 and δ > ˜ δ(P i), the set of non-dominated stationary
equilibria involve per period proﬁts given by






π1 ∈ [(1 − δ)π(P
∗
n(0)),δπ(P
i) − δ[a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P
i)]],




3 Does structure dominate input price regu-
lation?
The analysis in section 2 allows us to compare market outcomes either with
or without vertical integration for a wide range of input prices. In particular,
we can compare outcomes involving both diﬀerent regulated input prices and
diﬀerent industry structures.
As noted in the introduction, a regulated input price can diﬀer depending
on the industry structure. A social planner, when considering the desirable
industry structure will need to consider how structure interacts with the
regulated input price. Further, for any given input price, a range of ﬁnal
product prices can arise as equilibria. Hence, the social planner will need
to compare between sets of potential ﬁnal product prices to determine the
preferred industry structure.
In this section, we compare equilibrium outcomes when the regulated
input price diﬀers depending on industry structure. We show how, for a
15variety of reasonable objectives and beliefs of the social planner, an integrated
industry structure is preferred even if this structure necessarily involves a
higher regulated input price. In other words, integration will tend to result
in lower ﬁnal product prices even if it leads to a higher input price. In this
sense, industry structure is more important to the social planner than the
speciﬁc input price regulation.
To consider the social planner’s preferred industry structure, we ﬁrst need
to consider the set of possible retail price equilibria under diﬀerent structures
and for diﬀerent input prices. Let Sr(δ,ar) be the set of sustainable equilib-
rium retail prices when the upstream monopoly is independent of all retailers
and the regulated input price is ar. Si(δ,ai) is the equivalent set when the
upstream monopoly is integrated with one retailer and the regulated in-
put price is ai. Similarly, let Dr(δ,ar) and Di(δ,ai) represent the sets of
non-dominated equilibrium prices without and with integration respectively.
Again, ar refers to the regulated input price in the absence of integration and
ai is the regulated input price with integration.
From lemma 1, under assumption one, if δ > N
N+1 then Sr = {P : c+ar ≤
P ≤ P r(ar)}. From lemma 5, under assumption one and two, if δ ≥ ˜ δ(P i,ai),
then Si = {P : c + ai ≤ P ≤ P i}. As (i) P i ≤ P r(ar) with equality only if
ar = A and (ii) ˜ δ(P i,ai) ≥ N
N+1 for all ai, corollary 9 immediately follows.
Corollary 9 Suppose δ > ˜ δ(P i,ai). Then under assumptions one and two:
1. Sr(δ,ar) = Si(δ,ai) iﬀ ar = ai = A;
2. if ai ≥ ar > A then Si(δ,ai) is a strict subset of Sr(δ,ar), and the
maximal element Sr(δ,ar) is strictly greater than the maximal element
of Si(δ,ai); and
163. if A ≤ ai < ar then Si(δ,ai) is the union of two sets S0
i and S1
i where
(i) all elements of S0
i are less than the smallest element of Sr(δ,ar) and
(ii) S1
i is a strict subset of Sr(δ,ar), and the maximal element Sr(δ,ar)
is strictly greater than the maximal element of S1
i
This corollary shows that when ﬁrms are relatively patient the two equi-
librium price sets only coincide if the regulated input price is set at exactly
marginal cost regardless of industry structure. If however the social planner
is unsure of the exact marginal input cost or is constrained to set a > A to
guarantee ﬁrm viability, then either ai and/or ar is likely to be set above A.
In this case, the sets of potential equilibrium prices will diﬀer under diﬀerent
industry structures.
The social planner will generally be unsure of the exact equilibrium that
the ﬁrms will play, but it may have beliefs over the sets of equilibrium prices.
Assume that the social planner is interested in maximizing social surplus or
consumers’ welfare, so that it prefers a lower equilibrium price. We say that
one pair of industry structure and input price is socially preferred to another
if it supports equilibria with lower prices. Formally:
Deﬁnition: A set of equilibrium prices S1(δ,a1) under industry structure
1 and with input price a1 is socially preferred to another set S2(δ,a2) if (i)
p1 ∈ S1(δ,a1), p1 6∈ S2(δ,a2) implies that p1 < minp{p : p ∈ S2(δ,a2)} and
(ii) p2 ∈ S2(δ,a2), p2 6∈ S1(δ,a1) implies that p2 > maxp{p : p ∈ S1(δ,a1)}.
If one set of equilibrium prices is socially preferred to another, then this
means that where the two sets do not coincide, the preferred set always has
lower prices and the other set always has higher prices. The socially preferred
set will lead to greater expected social welfare or consumers’ surplus for a
variety of beliefs over the equilibrium sets. In particular, for any beliefs that
17coincide over prices that are in both sets, the socially preferred set will never
lead to lower expected social surplus or consumers’ surplus. In this sense,
an industry structure and input price that involves a socially preferred set of
equilibrium prices is a desirable outcome for the social planner.
Result 10 If A ≤ ai ≤ ar then a vertically integrated industry structure
leads to a set of equilibrium prices that is socially preferred to the set of
equilibrium prices under a vertically separated industry structure.
Result 10 states that if vertical integration does not result in a higher
regulated input price, then integration will be preferred by the social planner
(in the sense that it leads to a socially preferred set of equilibrium prices).
The result follows directly from corollary 9.
If ai > ar > A then neither Sr(δ,ar) nor Si(δ,ai) is socially preferred. But
these are exactly the situations that have raised concern in the literature —
where integration raises the regulated input price. In such a situation there
are a number of ways that the planner can determine the optimal combination
of input price and industry structure. One reasonable approach is that the
planner might wish to maximize the minimum level of consumer surplus or
social surplus. If the social planner follows this rule then result 11 follows
immediately from corollary 9.
Result 11 Suppose that δ > ˜ δ(P i,ai) and ar > A. If the social planner
wants to maximize the minimum possible equilibrium consumer or social sur-
plus, the planner will strictly prefer an industry structure where the input
monopoly owns a retail ﬁrm rather than an industry structure without any
vertical integration, regardless of the actual input prices.
Result 11 is very strong. If the social planner has a ‘maximin’ objective
then it will prefer to have an integrated industry structure regardless of the
18regulated input prices. In this sense, the industry structure dominates the
input price regulation. For example, suppose integration leads to a larger gap
between the true marginal input cost and the regulated input price. Despite
this, the social planner will still prefer an integrated industry structure to
one where the input monopoly is separate from the retail ﬁrms.
The social planner, of course, might use an alternative approach. For ex-
ample, the planner wish to maximize expected social surplus, given its beliefs
over the equilibrium prices that might arise under diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
industry structure and input price. In the absence of further information the
planner might have uniform beliefs over the prices in Sr(δ,ar) and Si(δ,ai).
If ar > A then the planner will strictly prefer integration if A ≤ ai ≤ ar as
Si(δ,ai) is socially preferred to Si(δ,ai). Further, as the set Si(δ,ai) is con-
tinuous in ai, there exist values ε > 0 such that if ai < ar + ε, the expected
social surplus with integration exceeds that without integration. Result 12
summarizes this conclusion.
Result 12 Suppose that δ > ˜ δ(P,¯ a) and given the industry structure, the
social planner has a uniform prior belief over all potential equilibrium prices.
Then, there exists values ε > 0 such that if A < ai ≤ ar ≤ ¯ a or if A < ar < ai
but ai < ar +ε ≤ ¯ a then the planner prefers an integrated industry structure.
Result 12 is not as strong as result 11. The planner might prefer a sep-
arated industry structure, but only if the input price under integration is
suﬃciently large compared with the input price under separate ownership.
While results 11 and 12 consider all potential equilibrium prices, it might
be reasonable for the social planner to focus on the equilibria that are un-
dominated from the perspective of the ﬁrms. Result 13 follows directly from
lemma 7 and 8 and the fact that Dr(δ,ar) = P r(ar) when δ > (N/N + 1).
19Result 13 Suppose that δ > ˜ δ(P i,ai) and ar > A. If the social planner
believes that the ﬁrms will only play undominated equilibria and wants to
maximize expected social surplus, then the regulator always strictly prefers
an integrated industry structure regardless of the actual access prices.
This result holds regardless of the beliefs that the social planner might
have over the set of undominated equilibria under an integrated industry
structure. The planner always ﬁnds integration preferable because all ele-
ments of the set of undominated equilibrium prices under integration, Di(δ,ai)
are less than P r regardless of the value of ai when ar > A. In other words,
even if the input price is signiﬁcantly higher under an integrated market
structure, the social planner will still prefer integration unless they know
that the input price can be set at exactly marginal cost in the absence of
integration.
Result 13 is partially driven by double marginalization. When the input
price is set above marginal cost and there is no vertical integration, the joint
proﬁt maximizing retail price must exceed the integrated monopoly price.
However, the implications of result 13 go further than this. Suppose, for
example, that under an integrated market structure, the integrated ﬁrm will
be a natural price leader. From lemma 8, the best non-dominated price for
the integrated ﬁrm will be below the integrated monopoly price whenever the
input price exceeds marginal cost. Because the integrated ﬁrm cares about
wholesale proﬁts it is prepared to trade-oﬀ some retail proﬁts for increased
wholesale proﬁts. As a price leader, the integrated ﬁrm will tend to set a
price that is both below the price that non-integrated ﬁrms would set and
below the integrated monopoly price.
So far we have considered the social planner’s preference over industry
structure when evaluating the set of possible equilibrium prices when δ is
20suﬃciently large. Alternatively, suppose the planner is uncertain about the
level of ‘patience’ of the ﬁrms in the industry, or about the potential number
of ﬁrms that might enter the industry. In these circumstances, the planner
might be concerned about the stability of any equilibrium price above c + a
under either industry structure. If a price above c+a is less stable under one
structure, in the sense that it will only be sustainable as an equilibrium if
either ﬁrms are more patient or if fewer ﬁrms compete in the retail market,
then the social planner might prefer the structure that lowers stability.
For any given values of ar and ai and for any speciﬁc price P that exceeds
both c+ar and c+ai but is no greater than P i, consider the set of discount
factors such that this price is sustainable as an equilibrium under either
structure. Denote this set by ∆r(P,ar) if the input monopoly is vertically
separated from the retailers and by ∆i(P,ai) if one of the retailers is owned
by the input monopoly. Corollary 14 follows from lemma 1, 5 and 6.
Corollary 14 Suppose ai > A and consider any price that exceeds both c+ai
and c + ar but is no greater than P i. Then ∆i(P,ai) is a strict subset of
∆r(P,ar). Further, any δ that is an element of ∆r(P,ar) but not an element
of ∆i(P,ai) is strictly less than all elements of ∆i(P,ai).
This corollary shows how any price that is a potential equilibrium under
both industry structures will always be ‘less stable’ if the upstream ﬁrm is
integrated into the downstream market. This is formalized by the following
result.
Result 15 Suppose ai > A and consider any price P that exceeds both c+ai
and c+ar but is no greater than P i. Further, suppose the social planner has
beliefs over the set of potential δ and wishes to choose the industry structure
where P is less likely to be an equilibrium. Then for all beliefs, the integrated
21structure is at least as desirable to the social planner as the non-integrated
structure. Further, for some beliefs over δ the social planner strictly prefers
the integrated structure.
Similarly, suppose the social planner is uncertain about the exact number
of ﬁrms that will participate in the retail market, but believes that the same
number of ﬁrms will participate under either structure. Given the discount
factor δ we can consider the stability of a potential equilibrium price P
by looking at the minimum number of ﬁrms that need to engage in retail
competition to ensure that the price is not sustainable. Denote this critical
minimum number of ﬁrms without integration by Nr. From lemma 1, Nr =
δ
1−δ for any relevant P. Similarly, if we denote the critical number of ﬁrms in
the absence of integration by Ni, from lemma 5, Ni < δ
1−δ for any relevant P.
In this sense, integrated equilibria are less stable when there is uncertainty
about the level of entry.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the consequences of alternative industry
structures when a monopoly supplies an essential input to a potentially com-
petitive downstream market. Our analysis suggests that there are a variety
of circumstances when a social planner will prefer an integrated industry
structure.
Our results are clearly at odds with many regulatory pre-conceptions. In
part this reﬂects the tendency in the literature to focus on the actual input
price. Integration may tend to raise the regulated input price and in a one-
shot model of competition this increased input price usually translates into
a higher retail price. The concerns about the input price are well founded.
22But the analysis above shows that these concerns might be overwhelmed by
the eﬀect that integration has on lowering retail prices. Integration makes
one retailer ‘care’ about wholesale proﬁts and provides an impetus to lower
prices.
The results in this paper also indicate the circumstances when integration
might be undesirable. In particular, if it is likely that A ≤ ar < ai and ﬁrms
will tend to behave highly competitively in the retail market regardless of
structure, then having a non-integrated structure with a lower input price will
improve social surplus. If integration makes it more likely that the regulated
input price will be set high then integration is undesirable if retail competition
is likely to be strong. Similarly, if integration is likely to make entry into
retail competition less likely, possibly because an integrated competitor can
more eﬀectively pursue anti-competitive conduct than a non-integrated ﬁrm,
then integration might be undesirable. Of course, for separate ownership to
be preferred, the anti-competitive potential under integration must outweigh
the innate tendency to lower prices that holds under integration.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider any P ∈ (c + a,P r]. This price will be
supportable as a stationary equilibrium with market shares ρn for all n =




π(P) ≥ π(P) (7)
Simplifying, this implies that P is supportable as a stationary equilibrium
price iﬀ
∀n ρn ∈ [1 − δ,1 − N(1 − δ)] (8)
Note that (8) does not depend on the value of P.
23For δ ≥ N
N+1, there always exist a set of market shares {ρn} such that,
for all n, ρn ∈ [0,1] and
P
n ρn = 1 with (8) is satisﬁed. To see this, let
ρ1 = 1−N(1−δ) and ρn = 1−δ for all n 6= 1. By construction, these market
shares satisfy (8) and sum to unity. Further, as δ ≥ N
N+1, ρn ∈ [0, 1
N+1] for
all n 6= 1 and ρ1 ∈ [ 1
N+1,1]. So, ρn ∈ [0,1] for all n.
In contrast, for δ < N
N+1 there never exists a set of market shares such
that (8) is satisﬁed. To see this, from (8)
X
n







so that any market shares that satisfy (8) must sum to greater than unity.
Proof of lemma 4: For ˆ P ∈ (P i,P r] to be an equilibrium, it must simul-
taneously satisfy (1) and (2) where P i replaces P on the right-hand-side of
(1).
Consider a putative equilibrium with price P i and market shares such
that ρnπ(P i) = πn( ˆ P) for n = 1,...,N. As Π(P i) > Π( ˆ P) by deﬁnition of
P i, ρN+1(P i) + [a − A]Q(P i) must exceed πN+1( ˆ P) + [a − A]Q( ˆ P) because
the proﬁts of all other ﬁrms has been held constant. Further, a price of P i
is strictly preferred by consumers to a price ˆ P > P i. Thus if the putative
equilibrium exists, it is Pareto preferred to the equilibrium with price ˆ P. It
remains to prove that this putative equilibrium exists.
First it is necessary to shows that suﬃcient retail proﬁts exist at P i to
allow ρnπ(P i) = πn( ˆ P) for all n = 1,...,N. Note that as price ˆ P is an




πn( ˆ P) ≤ π( ˆ P) − (1 − δ)π(P
i) − (1 − δ)[a − A]Q(P
i)




πn( ˆ P) − π(P
i) ≤ [Π( ˆ P) − Π(P
i)] − (1 − δ)π(P
i)
−δ[a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P
i)] < 0
so that π(P i) >
PN
n=1 πn( ˆ P) and there exists a set of market shares ρn ∈
[0,1],
PN
n=1 ρn < 1 such that ρnπ(P i) = πn( ˆ P). We denote these market
shares by ρ∗
n for n = 1,...,N.
Second, it is necessary to show that the strategies of both ﬁrms setting
a retail price equal to P i with market shares ρn = ρ∗
n and ρN+1 = 1 −
P
n ρ∗
n form an equilibrium. As ˆ P is an equilibrium, from (2) we know that
πn( ˆ P) ≥ (1 − δ)π( ˆ P) for all n. But, ρ∗
nπ(P i) = πn( ˆ P) by construction and
π( ˆ P) > π(P i) for ˆ P ∈ (P i,P r]. Hence ρ∗
nπ(P i) > (1 − δ)π(P i) for all n and
no non-integrated ﬁrm, n = 1,...,N will deviate. Similarly, by (1) with P i
replacing P on the right-hand-side,
πN+1( ˆ P) + [a − A]Q( ˆ P) ≥ (1 − δ)Π(P
i) + δ[a − A]Q(a + c)
But, as Π(P i) > Π( ˆ P) and ρ∗











i) + [a − A]Q(P
i) > (1 − δ)Π(P
i) + δ[a − A]Q(a + c)
and the integrated ﬁrm N + 1 will not deviate. As no ﬁrm will deviate, the
putative equilibrium is an actual equilibrium, and this equilibrium Pareto
dominates the original equilibrium at price ˆ P. 
Proof of lemma 5: We can rewrite (1) and (2) respectively as
πN+1(P) ≥ π(P) − δ(π(P) − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)]) (9)
∀n∈{1,...,N} πn(P) ≥ π(P) − δπ(P) (10)
25But π(P) = πN+1(P) +
P
n πn(P) so by (9) and (10)
π(P) ≥ π(P) − δ(π(P) − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)]) + Nπ(P) − δNπ(P)
Simplifying, this means that P is sustainable as an equilibrium iﬀ
δ ≥
Nπ(P)
(N + 1)π(P) − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)]
(11)
Substitution shows that (11) is identical to δ ≥ ˜ δ(P,a). 
Proof of lemma 6: For (i), note that ˜ δ(P,a) can be written as
˜ δ(P,a) =
Nπ(P)
Nπ(P) + Π(P) − Π(a + c)
Taking the derivative of this expression, the sign of (∂˜ δ(P,a)/∂P) will be the
same as the sign of Nπ0(P)[Π(P)−Π(a+c)]−NΠ0(P)π(P). But, [Π(P i)−
Π(a + c)] > 0 and Π0(P i) = 0 while π0(P i) > 0 so that (∂˜ δ(P i,a)/∂P) > 0.




π(P)[Nπ(P) + Π(P) − Π(a + c)] − Nπ(P)Π(P)
((N + 1)Q(P)[P − a − c] − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)])
2
=
Π(P) − Π(a + c)
((N + 1)Q(P)[P − a − c] − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)])
2
> 0 for all P > a + c




[Q(a + c) − Q(P)][P − a − c]NQ(P)
((N + 1)Q(P)[P − a − c] − [a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)])
2
> 0 for all P > a + c
For (iv), taking the derivative of ˜ δ(P,a) with regards to P, it is easy to
conﬁrm that if for all P > a + c
−π(P)(a − A)Q
0(P) − (π
0(P)(a − A)[Q(a + c) − Q(P)] < 0 (12)
26then (∂˜ δ(P,a)/∂P) > 0. Substitution and simpliﬁcation shows that (12) is
equivalent to
∀P>a+c Q(a + c)Q
0(P)[P − a − c] + [Q(a + c) − Q(P)]Q(P) < 0
To see that this always holds under assumption two, let z(P) = Q(a +
c)Q0(P)[P − a − c] + [Q(a + c) − Q(P)]Q(P). Then, z(a + c) = 0 and
z0(P) = Q(a+c)Q00(P)(P−a−c)+2Q0(P)[Q(a+c)−Q(P)] < 0 if Q00(P) ≤ 0.
So if Q00(P) ≤ 0 then z(P) < 0 for all P > a + c. 
Proof of lemma 7: Let N refer to the subset of ﬁrms as well as the number
of ﬁrms in the subset and N c refer to the set of all non-integrated ﬁrms not
in the set N. By (1) and (2)the proﬁt maximizing equilibrium price for a







πN+1(P) ≥ (1 − δ)π(P) + δ[a − A][Q(a + c) − Q(P)]
and
∀n∈Nc πn(P) ≥ (1 − δ)π(P)
By substitution and diﬀerentiation, the solution to this problem is given by
P ∗




r (N))[1 − (N + 1 − N)(1 − δ)] + δ[a − A]Q
0(P
∗
r (N)) = 0 (13)
But this is identical to (3). Further, it is easy to conﬁrm that the second
order conditions for this solution are satisﬁed under assumption 2.
To see that P ∗
r (N) < P i when N < N but P ∗
r (N) = P i note that we can
rewrite (13) as
δΠ
0(P) − (N − N)(1 − δ)π
0(P) = 0 (14)
27When N = N, (14) becomes δΠ0(P) = 0 which has a unique solution at
P = P i. When N < N, (N − N)(1 − δ)π0(P) > 0 at all P < P r so that
Π0(P ∗
r (N)) > 0 and P ∗
r (N) < P i.
To see that P ∗
r (N) > c + a for all N, note that if P ∗




r ) ≤ 0. But this clearly cannot be the optimal price as
P
n∈N πn(P i) > 0 for a + c < P i. 
Proof of lemma 8: Let N refer to the subset of ﬁrms as well as the
number of non-integrated ﬁrms in the subset and N c refer to the set of all
non-integrated ﬁrms not in the set N. By (1) and (2)the proﬁt maximizing
equilibrium price for a subset of ﬁrms including the integrated ﬁrm and N
non-integrated ﬁrms is given by the solution to
max
P





∀n∈Nc πn(P) ≥ (1 − δ)π(P) and ∀n πn(P) ≥ 0
By substitution and diﬀerentiation, the solution to this problem is given by
the price P such that
π
0(P)[1 − (N − N)(1 − δ)] + [a − A]Q
0(P) = 0 (15)
if this is greater than a+c. But this is identical to (4). Further, it is easy to
conﬁrm that the second order conditions for this solution are satisﬁed under
assumption two. So long as the solution to (4) is no less than a+c then this
price is P ∗
i (N).
To see that P ∗
i (N) < P i when N < N but P ∗
i (N) = P i note that we can
rewrite (15) as
Π
0(P) − (N − N)(1 − δ)π
0(P) = 0 (16)
28When N = N, (16) becomes Π0(P) = 0 which has a unique solution at
P = P i. When N < N, (N − N)(1 − δ)π0(P) > 0 at all P < P r so that
Π0(P ∗
i (N)) > 0 and P ∗
i (N) < P i.
To see that the solution to (4) is strictly greater than c+a for all N, note
that the left hand side of (16) is increasing in δ for any P ≤ P i. Also, note
that by LeHopital’s rule, ˜ δ(a + c,a) =
Nπ0(a+c)
Nπ0(a+c)+Π0(a+c). Under assumption 2,
˜ δ(a + c,a) < ˜ (P i,a) and by assumption, δ > ˜ δ(P i,a). So if the left hand
side of (16) exceeds zero for δ = ˜ δ(a + c,a) and P = a + c, it follows that
P ∗
i (N) > a + c. But this is easily conﬁrmed. Substitution of ˜ δ(a + c,a) and
P = a + c into the left-hand-side of (16) yields
(Π0(a + c))2 + Nπ0(a + c)Π0(a + c)
Nπ0(a + c) + Π0(a + c)
> 0
Finally, it is necessary to conﬁrm that the price P ∗
i (N) with the relevant
division of proﬁts is sustainable as an equilibrium. But this directly follows
from the assumption that δ > ˜ δ(P i,a) so that all prices P > a + c are
sustainable as equilibria, and from construction as all ﬁrms not in set N are
held to their minimum proﬁt levels that guarantee that they will not deviate.
Thus, there is some division of proﬁts among the ﬁrms in set N that ensures
that the price P ∗
i (N) is an equilibrium. 
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